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Manly: Criminal
Law: Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel When Accused
CASE COMMENTS

to distinguish Escobedo, but it is difficult to imagine the Supreme
Court allowing such a limitation to foreclose relief to one who misunderstood his rights.
Escobedo is notable for its disregard of precedent and questionable
reasoning. Of far greater significance, however, is the practical effect
it will have upon law enforcement. The decision represents a giant
step toward barring from evidence all incriminating statements obtained from suspects, voluntary and involuntary. It will effectively
prevent much police interrogation, fair and unfair. By clothing its
decision in such legally undefined language as "focus" and by not expressly overruling Crooker or Cicenia, the Court has left itself ample
room either to narrow or broaden Escobedo with future decisions.
Until such decisions are rendered, however, one cannot accurately
draw the line between prerogatives of the police and rights of the
accused. While talking right to counsel doctrine, the Court has
actually moved toward the creation of a new constitutional right,
the right not to incriminate oneself by making voluntary disclosures.
GENE D. BROWN

CRIMINAL LAW: INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO APPOINTED
COUNSEL WHEN ACCUSED OF MISDEMEANORS
Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964) in light of Harvey
v. State, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965)
In Fish v. State, appellant sought in the Court of Record, Alachua
County, Florida, to test the legality of his confinement based upon
pleas of guilty and subsequent conviction of misdemeanors in that
court. Appellant based his motion to vacate committment' on the
ground that at no time during the original proceedings that led to
his conviction was he represented by counsel and therefore was denied
due process of law under both the United States and Florida Constitutions. At the hearing on appellant's motion the Alachua County
1. FLA. R. Caim. P. 1.
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Court of Record found that at the time of the original proceedings
appellant was not represented by counsel, that he was indigent, that
he did not request appointment of counsel, and that the court did
not offer to appoint counsel. On these findings the court denied appellant's motion on the ground that the court is not required to appoint counsel for indigents charged with misdemeanors. On direct
appeal 2 from the court of record the Florida Supreme Court HELD,
an indigent accused of committing a misdemeanor is not entitled to
have counsel appointed to assist him in his defense. Judgment affirmed.
One year after the Florida Supreme Court handed down the Fish
decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a contrary decision in Harvey v. State. In Harvey, a Mississippi defendant was
accused of a misdemeanor that carried a potential penalty of a five
hundred dollar fine and ninety days in the county jail. The defendant
pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace court and was released on
bond. The justice of the peace found the defendant guilty in absentia
and imposed the maximum penalty, but failed to notify the defendant of his actions until the time for appeal had elapsed. While incarcerated, the defandant was denied a writ of error coram nobis in
the Mississippi Supreme Court and then petitioned the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for a writ of
habeas corpus. Defendant alleged that his conviction and imprisonment constituted a denial of due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment because he did not have the assistance of counsel nor
was he advised of his right to counsel. The district court denied the
petition on the grounds that the defendant had not exhausted his
state remedies. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
defendant had, as a practical matter, exhausted his state remedies
and HELD, the failure to notify defendant of his right to counsel
rendered his conviction and subsequent incarceration constitutionally
invalid.
In the now famous Gideon v. Wainwright3 decision the United
States Supreme Court held that the right to counsel is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants is
required in state courts. From the facts and holding of Gideon it is
obvious that the right to court appointed counsel extends to indigents
accused of felonies. As pointed out in Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Gideon,4 the United States Supreme Court left unanswered
the question whether the rule of the case extends to all criminal
cases. Thus the scope of the Gideon holding was not clearly defined.
2. FLA. CONST. art. V, §4 (2).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. Id. at 349.
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The Florida Legislature adopted a narrow view of Gideon when it enacted the Public Defender Act of 1963, 5 which provided counsel only
for indigents accused of noncapital felonies. In the Fish case, the
Florida Supreme Court refused to extend the right of counsel to indigents accused of misdemeanors, basing its decision on the lack of
a clear mandate in Gideon and the policy expressed by the Florida
Legislature in the Public Defender Act.
By leaving the scope of Gideon undefined the United States Supreme Court left this task to the individual states. Financial considerations would presently make it extremely burdensome for Florida
to have to furnish counsel to indigents accused of all crimes. Thus
the problem facing the Florida Supreme Court in Fish was how to
reconcile these financial considerations with the expanding rights of
individuals. Fish accepted the previously codified felony-misdemeanor
classifications as the proper balance between fundamental fairness and
practical necessity. If Florida law, as does federal law,6 differentiated
between felony and misdemeanor strictly upon the severity of possible
punishment, such a dividing line would seem just. Although the
Florida Constitution7 and a statutory provision" define a felony as any
criminal offense that is punishable by death or imprisonment in the
state penitentiary, the Florida Legislature also has the prerogative of
defining any specific crime as a felony or misdemeanor. If the legislature specifies the punishment as imprisonment in the county jail,
or fails to specify where imprisonment is to take place, the crime is
classified as a misdemeanor regardless of the length of the confinement.9 Consequently, Florida's felony-misdemeanor classifications appear to be nothing more than arbitrary labels often unconnected with
the severity of the punishment. 6 As an extreme example, one Florida
misdemeanor-' carries a maximum penalty of five years in the county
jail although several felonies32 provide for a maximum imprisonment
of one year. The Fish decision results in the inconsistency that an
indigent charged with a one-year felony would have a right to courtappointed counsel, but the indigent charged with the five-year misdemeanor would be denied that right. In finding that the defendant
in Harvey had been unconstitutionally deprived of his right to
counsel the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief
5.

FLA. STAT.

§27.51 (1963).

6. 18 U.S.C. §1 (1958).
7. FLA. CONsr. art. XVI, §25.
8. FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1963).

9. FLA. STAT. §§775.06, .08 (1963).
10. See Clark, Curable Ills of the Criminal Law of Florida. 16 U. FLA. L. Rav.

258 (1963).
11.

FLA. STAT. §548.01 (1963).

12. E.g., FLA. STAT. § §795.01, 797.02, 817.16 (1963).
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Judge Tuttle, expressed the view that the rationale of the cases that
have held the sixth amendment right to counsel is applicable to state
prosecutions, "does not seem to depend on the often purely formal
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors."'l a
The Florida Supreme Court, basing its decision on the lack of a
clear mandate in Gideon and the legislative policy expressed in the
Public Defender Act, said, "we do not feel we are authorized to overturn the legislative declaration of the policy of this state ...."14 In
defining the scope of Gideon, the Florida Supreme Court seems to
overlook the fact that the right to counsel invoked in that case arises
from the federal constitution. The judiciary is charged with the
sole responsibility of interpreting that document and in this light
the Florida Supreme Court's deference to the legislative branch seems
inappropriate. With the exception of a Texas decision's involving
a short period of confinement and probably strictly limited to its
facts, other state courts that have considered the scope of Gideon
have been unwilling to limit its application to felonies.16 These courts
recognize that the right to counsel stems from the federal constitution
and therefore it is incumbent upon the courts to determine the scope
of Gideon.
Although the Florida Supreme Court could not change the constitutional definition of a felony, nor could it change the statutory
inequities that have arisen, there is no prohibition against the Florida
Supreme Court directing the trial courts to appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases when, in their discretion, it is required by fundamental
fairness. In view of the inconsistent treatment of defendants, which
necessarily results from Fish, it would seem desirable for the court
to have made the indigent's right to appointed counsel dependent upon the severity of punishment to which he could be subjected rather
than on the classification of the crime as a felony or misdemeanor.
Although the United States Supreme Court has, to date, refused to
decide the specific scope of Gideon, to assume that they will continue
to do so is unrealistic. Harvey, in defining the scope of Gideon,
probably supersedes Fish as the law applicable to Florida. It seems
likely that the state of Mississippi will request review of the Harvey
case by the United States Supreme Court. The Court will be faced
with several alternatives. It could deny certiorari thereby leaving
Harvey as the law in this circuit. Or it could grant certiorari and
affirm the decision thereby categorically stating that every defendant
13.

Harvey v. State, 340 F.2d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1965). (Emphasis added.)

14. Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
15. Pizzitola v. State, 374 S.W.2d 446 (Crim. App. Tex. 1963).
16. State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964); Patterson v. State,
231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
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